Venerability

From James Fallows’ blog:

Does this mean that everything Gates proposes is right, that the defense budget has been pared to the essentials, and that all systemic problems have been solved? Of course not. The best single starting point for the necessary ongoing critique is the venerable “Defense and the National Interest” site here, or the book America’s Defense Meltdown which I have so often touted, now on sale here.

I’ll take that as a compliment.  DNI began ten years ago, almost to the day, to house the comments — blasters as they were known — that Chuck Spinney was writing at the time.  If you’re interested, they’re still here.  Our development costs were covered by a grant from the Project on Government Oversight, and many thanks, again, to our good friends at POGO.

And, of course, thanks to James Fallows for his encouragement over the years.  Go pay a visit to his blog and subscribe to the very venerable Atlantic (I do).

Comments are welcome; please observe our comment policy.

Be Sociable, Share!

Filed in Uncategorized | One response so far

One Response to “Venerability”

  1. loggie20on 19 Apr 2009 at 6:58 pm 1

    Facts are important.

    The F 22 has a measured mission capable rate of .62. That means if the USAF owned 400 of them that 248 would be flyable at any givien time.

    The F-22 is not suitable which includes affordable as one measure along with safe, reliable, maintainable, supportable, operable by normal fighter pilot, etc.

    Mission capable is related to reliable, operable, mainatinable, supportable, suply/logistics performance, procurement support etc.

    Cost overruns and delays hurt achieving needed finctions in many suitability areas leading to “unaffordable” as one observation.

    When the 62% was publicized, USAF lost a lot of credibility on the “urgency” of more F 22.

    Many of the systems not on the chopping block are also unaffordable.

    The Quadrennial Defense Review needs to be rigorous.

    [CR: Facts is facts. A rigorous QDR would be most appropriate right about now. One issue they might consider: Gates said that “Another important thing I looked at was whether modernization programs, in particular ground modernization programs, had incorporated the operational and combat experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan.” These experiences would be relevant only if we intended to repeat this type of combat. And we would do that only if we planned to occupy foreign countries again for extended periods of time.]