

America's Defense Meltdown



PENTAGON REFORM FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA AND CONGRESS

13 non-partisan Pentagon insiders, retired military officers
& defense specialists speak out

Washington, D.C.
November 2008

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Thomas Christie began his career in the Department of Defense and related positions in 1955. He retired from the Pentagon in February 2005 after four years as director of Operational Test & Evaluation. There he was responsible for advising the secretary of defense on policy and procedures for testing weapon systems and for providing independent evaluations of the test results to both the defense secretary and Congress. He earlier served as director of the Operational Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he was also intimately involved in DOD weapons testing. Between 1985 and 1989, he was director of program integration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for developing processes for managing the defense acquisition system. Prior to that, he had served in two separate positions under the assistant secretary of defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation): director of Tactical Air Division and deputy assistant secretary of defense for General Purpose Programs. Before coming to the Pentagon in 1973, Christie was the director of the Weapon System Analysis Division at the Air Force Armament Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where he had begun his career as a weapons analyst.

Col. Robert Dilger (U.S. Air Force, ret.) started in the Air Force as an enlisted man and then entered flight training to become an F-86 pilot. He was the squadron weapons expert and a member of the European fighter wing's F-86 weapons team. He later flew F-84 fighters for the Air National Guard and was recalled to active duty during the Cuban missile crisis. Later, he was in the fighter wing's "tactics shop" at DaNang Air Force Base in Vietnam, serving under the famous "No Guts, No Glory" Col. "Boots" Blesse. Dilger was shot down over Vietnam by anti-aircraft artillery on his 187th mission in the war and was credited with one "kill" in an F-4. He received three Silver Stars, four Distinguished Flying Crosses and a Purple Heart for his war service. His next job was as an instructor in charge of air-to-air training at the Air Force Weapon's School, Nellis Air Force Base, Neb. – the Air Force's famous "top gun" school. Upon graduation from the Army War College in 1975, he became the armament director of the A-10 in charge of the 30-mm cannon and its ammunition. There, he reduced the cost of the ammunition to one-eighth its earlier expense and improved its effectiveness – doing so with a novel program that re-completed the production contract year after year.

Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the Marine Corps Reserve for 20 years, joining as a private in 1977 and retiring as a major in 1997. The author of seven books and

several hundred articles, he is a historian who specializes in the internal workings of military forces (their structure, training, doctrine and culture) as well as the way that these things influence their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

William S. Lind served as a legislative aide for armed services for Sen. Robert Taft, Jr., R-Ohio, from 1973 to 1976 and held a similar position with Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, D-Colo., from 1977 to 1986. He is one of the founders of the American military reform movement and anticipated the debate over maneuver warfare with an article in *Military Review* in March 1977, "Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army." He is author of the "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" (Westview Press, 1985) and co-author, with Gary Hart, of "America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform" (Adler & Adler, 1986). Mr. Lind was heavily involved with the adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps in the early 1980s, assisting with the writing of FMFM-1, "Warfighting" and FMFM 1-1, "Campaigning," and co-authoring FMFM 1-3, "Tactics." Mr. Lind has also written widely for both professional and popular publications.

Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, ret.) was awarded the bronze star with "V" device in 1991 for valor for his leadership of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment that destroyed an Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade in the first Gulf war. After that, in November 1997, Macgregor was assigned to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) where he became the director of the Joint Operations Center during the Kosovo Air Campaign. In January 2002, Macgregor was directed by the secretary of defense to present the CENTCOM commander with a concept for intervention in Iraq. The plan assumed a no-notice armored attack on two axes and that Iraqi Army and administrative structures would be retained. Though modified in unfortunate ways, major elements of his concept were adopted. He is also author of four books, including "Breaking the Phalanx" (Praeger, 1997) and "Transformation Under Fire" (Praeger, 2003), which have significantly influenced thinking about transformation inside America's ground forces. His newest book, "Warrior's Rage: The Battle of 73 Easting" will appear in 2009.

Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is a consultant and writer based in Atlanta. He is the author of "If We Can Keep It: A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration" (Center for Defense Information, 2007), "Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business" (Xlibris, 2004) and other publications on Third and Fourth Generation Warfare. He holds a doctorate in mathematics and is adjunct professor of strategy and quantitative analysis at Kennesaw State University.

Lt. Col. John Sayen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) served in the Marine Corps' artillery, armor and military intelligence. He retired in 2002. During his last years of service, he worked at the Pentagon analyzing and reporting on trends in international affairs that would affect U.S. interests. Mr. Sayen has published two books on the Army and the Marine Corps and numerous articles for military and historical periodicals. He currently works as the senior contract doctrine writer at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.

Pierre Sprey consulted for Grumman Aircraft's research department from 1958 to 1965, then joined Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids" in the Pentagon. There, in 1967, he met the Air Force's brilliant and original tactician, Col. John Boyd and quickly became a disciple and collaborator of Boyd's. Together with another innovative fighter pilot, Col. Everest Riccioni (U.S. Air Force), they started and carried out the concept design of the F-16 air-to-air fighter, then brought the program to fruition through five years of continuous bureaucratic guerilla warfare. More or less simultaneously, Sprey also headed up the technical side of the Air Force's concept design team for the A-10 close support fighter. Then, against even steeper opposition than the F-16 faced, he helped implement the A-10's innovative live-fire, prototype fly-off competition and subsequent production. Sprey left the Pentagon in 1971 but continued to consult actively on the F-16, the A-10, tanks and anti-tank weapons, and realistic operational/live-fire testing of major weapons. At the same time, he became a principal in two consulting firms; the first doing environmental research and analysis, the second consulting on international defense planning and weapons analysis. During this period, Sprey continued the seminal work of Col. Richard Hallock (U.S. Army/Airborne) in founding the field of combat history/combat data-based cost effectiveness analysis for air and ground weapons. During the late 1970s, Colonel Boyd and Sprey, together with a small, dedicated group of Pentagon and congressional insiders, started the military reform movement. Attracting considerable attention from young officers, journalists and congressmen, the movement led to establishment of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus and to passage of several military reform bills in the early '80s. Sprey continues to work with reform-minded foundations and journalists. Numerous articles, books and theses have described the work of Colonel Boyd and Sprey on the F-16, A-10 and military reform. These include Robert Coram's "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War" (Little, Brown & Co., 2002) and James Fallows' "National Defense" (Random House, 1981).

James P. Stevenson is the former editor of the Navy Fighter Weapon School's *Topgun Journal*; author of "The Pentagon Paradox" (Naval Institute Press, 1993), a history of the Navy's F-18 Hornet development; and of "The \$5 Billion Misunderstanding" (Naval Institute Press, 2001), a history of the Navy's failed A-12 Avenger II stealth bomber

program. He also served as the assistant managing editor of *Air Safety Week* and west coast correspondent for *Defense Week*. He has written many articles in professional and popular journals and has lectured on numerous occasions on national security and aviation issues.

Maj. Donald E. Vandergriff (U.S. Army, ret.) served for 24 years of active duty as an enlisted Marine and Army officer. He has had numerous troop, staff and educational assignments in the United States and abroad. Donald Vandergriff was named ROTC instructor of the year 2002-2003 and the 3rd ROTC Brigade instructor of the year for 2003-2004. Vandergriff is a frequently published authority on the U.S. Army personnel system, Army culture, leadership development, soldier training, and the emergence of Fourth Generation Warfare. He has authored many articles and briefings, as well as four books: “Spirit, Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century” (Presidio Press, 2001), “The Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs” (Presidio Press, 2002), “Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War” (Center for Defense Information, 2006) and “Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s Centurions” (Praeger Security International, 2008). Vandergriff is currently a contractor in support of the Army Capabilities Integration Center Forward at Crystal City, Va.

Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a retired veteran. He was a close associate of the late Col. John Boyd.

Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. He has authored two books: “The Wastrels of Defense” (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2004) about Congress and national security, and “Military Reform” (Praeger Security International, 2007). From 1971 to 2002, Wheeler worked on national security issues for members of the U.S. Senate and for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). In the Senate, he was the first – and according to Senate records the last – individual to work simultaneously on the personal staffs of a Republican and a Democrat. Wheeler is the editor of this anthology.

DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Genuine reform often requires swimming against strong currents of conventional wisdom and a refusal to pander to politically driven notions of what is and is not acceptable to think and do at the time. Governments often refuse to acknowledge and act on serious problems that undermine a nation's security – subsequently to be noted by even the most routine of historians to have been blind and foolish. The real test of statesmanship – no matter how unpopular the recognition of needed action may be among the blinkered paragons of contemporary conventional wisdom – is to note and act on the problems before they overwhelm the state.

For the wisdom and the moral courage to see and then act, the authors of this volume wish to recognize the memory of Col. John R. Boyd (U.S. Air Force). For the strength of character and extraordinary generosity of spirit that made this volume possible, the authors wish to thank and recognize Philip A. Straus, Jr., the founder of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, along with the additional support of the Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust and its founder and guiding light, the late Stewart R. Mott, and the many private individuals who also contributed to the support of this work.

The authors also wish to thank the staff of the World Security Institute and the Center for Defense Information for their spirited support, diligent work and skillful professionalism in the completion of this book. Especially to be noted are Bruce Blair, Theresa Hitchens, Drew Portocarrero, Suzanne Ostrofsky, Ron Hinrichs, Deniz Ozdemir, Laura McHugh, Valerie Reed and Ana Marte.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	ix
Executive Summary	xiii
CHAPTER 1	1
Introduction and Historic Overview: The Overburden of America's Outdated Defenses Lt. Col. John Sayen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)	
CHAPTER 2	26
Shattering Illusions: A National Security Strategy for 2009-2017 Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.)	
CHAPTER 3	53
Leading the Human Dimension Out of a Legacy of Failure Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) and Maj. Donald Vandergriff (U.S. Army, ret.)	
CHAPTER 4	80
Maneuver Forces: The Army and Marine Corps after Iraq Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, ret.) and Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)	
CHAPTER 5	97
A Traveler's Perspective on Third and Fourth Generation War Mr. William S. Lind	
CHAPTER 6	118
The Navy Mr. William S. Lind	
CHAPTER 7	129
Reversing the Decay of American Air Power Col. Robert Dilger (U.S. Air Force, ret.) and Mr. Pierre M. Sprey	

CHAPTER 8	167
Air Mobility Alternatives for a New Administration	
Mr. James P. Stevenson	183
CHAPTER 9	
The Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve	
Mr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson	
CHAPTER 10	195
Long in Coming, the Acquisition Train Wreck Is Here	
Mr. Thomas Christie	
CHAPTER 11	219
Understand, Then Contain America's Out-of-Control Defense Budget	
Mr. Winslow T. Wheeler	

PREFACE

The vast majority, perhaps even all, of Congress, the general officer corps of the armed forces, top management of American defense manufacturers, prominent members of Washington's think-tank community and nationally recognized "defense journalists" will hate this book. They will likely also urge that it be ignored by both parties in Congress and especially by the new president and his incoming national security team.

It is not just that following the recommendations of this book will mean the cancellation of numerous failing, unaffordable and ineffective defense programs, as well as the jobs, and more importantly careers, those programs enable. The acceptance of data and analysis presented in this book, and the conclusions and recommendations that flow from them, would require the elite of Washington's national security community to acknowledge the many flaws in their analysis of weapons, Pentagon management and leadership of the nation in a tumultuous world. In too many cases, it would also require those elites to admit their own role in the virtual meltdown of America's defenses.

The mere notion of a "meltdown" within the U.S. military may seem ridiculous to many. America's armed forces are surely the best in the world, perhaps even in history. Democrats and Republicans, liberals, moderates and conservatives in Washington all agree on at least that. On what basis does a bunch of lesser known, if not obscure, analysts make such a preposterous assertion? Our equipment is the most sophisticated and effective in the world. We easily whipped one of the largest armies in the Middle East, not once but twice, and we have now clearly mastered a once difficult and ugly situation in Iraq. Success in Afghanistan will not be far away, once we devote the proper resources there.

Those who take comfort in the last three sentences are the people who need to read and consider the contents of this book the most. Reflect on the following:

- America's defense budget is now larger in inflation adjusted dollars than at any point since the end of World War II, and yet our Army has fewer combat brigades than at any point in that period, our Navy has fewer combat ships and the Air Force has fewer combat aircraft. Our major equipment inventories for these major forces are older on average than at any point since 1946; in some cases they are at all-time historical highs in average age.

- The effectiveness of America's "high-tech" weapons does not compensate for these reduced numbers. The Air Force's newest fighter, the F-35, can be regarded as only a technical failure. The Navy's newest destroyer cannot protect itself effectively against aircraft and missiles, and the Army's newest armored vehicle cannot stand up against a simple anti-armor rocket that was first designed in the 1940s.
- Despite decades of acquisition reform from Washington's best minds in Congress, the Pentagon and the think tanks, cost overruns in weapon systems are higher today, in inflation adjusted dollars, than any time ever before. Not a single major weapon system has been delivered on time, on cost and as promised for performance. The Pentagon refuses to tell Congress and the public exactly how it spends the hundreds of billions of dollars appropriated to it each year. The reason for this is simple; it doesn't know how the money is spent. Technically, it doesn't even know *if* the money is spent. Even President George W. Bush's own Office of Management and Budget has labeled the Pentagon as one of the worst managed agencies of the entire federal government.
- At the start of the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon's senior military leadership failed to warn the nation's civilian leaders of the tremendously difficult mission they were being asked to perform. Indeed, most of the military hierarchy did not even comprehend the difficulties of those missions and misperceived that the key issue was the number of military personnel sent to invade and then occupy an alien land in the Middle East. And then, many of them publicly complained that the civilian leadership had made a mess of things, saying so from the comfort of a retirement pension.
- In Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there have been acrimonious hearings and meetings, but no real oversight to appreciate just how and where programs and policies ran off the tracks. Except for a very, very small handful, no one has been held accountable. Indeed, it is not even apparent that anyone in Congress knows how to perform oversight. If they do, they apparently lack the spine to perform it in a manner Harry Truman, who carried out superb oversight as a senator during World War II, would call competent.
- Perhaps most damning of all, America has permitted itself, and most leaders from both political parties have aggressively pursued, a national security strategy that has torn us apart domestically, isolated us from our allies, made us an object of disrespect in the eyes of those uncommitted to our cause and caused our enemies to find motivation for greater action on their own part. In fact, it is not even clear whether our national leadership understands what an

effective national security strategy is, much less how to put one together and exercise it effectively.

And what of the great victories in the Persian Gulf, the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait and the 2003 invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein's hostile regime? Don't those U.S. operations prove our armed forces' historic superiority? America did quickly beat Iraq's armed forces in 1991, and in the early phases of the 2003 invasion, but those victories were both incomplete and against forces best characterized as grossly incompetent – perhaps even the “most incompetent in the world.”¹ Against the best of Saddam Hussein's forces, the so-called Republican Guard, America's military commanders in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 failed to capture or destroy the Guard as the single prop to Saddam's regime that enabled him to survive the war. In 2003, the Army's most senior commanders again made fundamental tactical, operational and strategic errors, and in one situation virtually panicked when faced with an enemy that was virtually immobilized by its own incompetence.²

The architects of the current war in Iraq slickly proclaim victory in sight thanks to the success of the “surge” there. Politically motivated to their very core, they studiously ignore the internal dynamics in Iraq and the region that have been inestimably more powerful in lowering the violence there. Blind as the proverbial bat, they and even opponents to the Iraq misadventure now proclaim that more of the same in Afghanistan will rescue the collapsing situation there. As Pentagon wags used to remark inside the building, “it's data-free analysis and analysis-free decisions” that are driving U.S. policy.

Many American soldiers, sailors, marines and aviators are rightly honored by the American public for their courage and sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan, but quality at the combat-unit level cannot compensate for inadequate leadership at the highest levels.

The authors of this volume seek to inform the new president and the new Congress of the pervasive nature of serious, decades-long problems that are corroding not just our military power, but our national strength. Each chapter addresses the nature of problems as we see them in a discrete sector of our national security apparatus and, just as importantly, proposes solutions based on the nature of the problem – rather than on the limited willingness of political actors to ape reform. These chapters progress from:

- an analysis of America's military heritage relevant to our international situation today in chapter 1,
- to a discussion of the components of a competent national strategy and how to construct and implement one in chapter 2,

- to a wholesale, perhaps even radical, change in how America trains its military leaders to think and operate (a change already beginning to occur in some important corners in the U.S. Army) in chapter 3,
- to two alternative, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, visions of America's ground forces in the Army and Marine Corps in chapters 4 and 5,
- to a prescription to make the U.S. Navy relevant to the 21st century, rather than to the middle of the last century, in chapter 6,
- to a compelling vision of the dogma that ails our Air Force and how to build combat air forces that are both astonishingly inexpensive and devastatingly effective in all forms of warfare in chapter 7,
- to a new plan for the vitally important airlift and support portions of our Air Force in chapter 8,
- to a new paradigm for our reserves and National Guard in chapter 9,
- to what has gone amiss for the last several decades in our weapons acquisition and Pentagon management apparatus in chapter 10,
- to a depiction of the hyper-cost of our shrinking, aging and less effective military forces in chapter 11.

Each author writes for himself and, we believe, the nation. We all can probably find something in each other's chapter with which we disagree, sometimes strenuously. However, all contributors share a common view that our problems are severe and longstanding, that they do not relate to just one political party or ideological faction, and that at the core of our problems and their solution resides a fundamental question of ethics.

We invite a national debate to probe our national security troubles and how best to summon the character and persistence that their solution will require.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas Withington, "What If We Battled a Real Army?" *Long Island Newsday*, August 27, 2003.
2. For further discussion, see Winslow T. Wheeler and Lawrence J. Korb, *Military Reform: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), Chapter 6.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter Summaries and Recommendations

Chapter 1

Introduction and Historic Overview:

The Overburden of America's Outdated Defenses

Lt. Col. John Sayen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)

Our military forces have become high-cost dinosaurs that are insufficiently lethal against most of the enemies we are likely to face. Our forces have also broken free of their constitutional controls to the point where they have essentially become a presidential military. Congress exerts meaningful control neither in peacetime nor in wartime – and has lost all control over going to war. The large peacetime standing army established just before World War II (and maintained ever since) has become a vehicle for misuse by presidents, and multiple other parties both internal and external to the Pentagon.

The large standing forces were supposed to facilitate professional preparation for war, but the essential officer corps never truly professionalized itself. Thus, we were almost invariably unprepared, in mind set and in doctrine, for the conflicts we faced. In both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, America hurriedly threw together unprofessionally led armies to fight – too often ineffectively. The result, especially today, has been notably mediocre senior military leadership – with only the rarest exceptions. At the same time, our armed forces have become ruinously expensive, as they simultaneously shrink, age, and become remarkably less capable. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the Army and Marine Corps have been stretched to the limits of their strength to fight enemies not even a tenth as numerous as those they faced in Vietnam. We have become a pampered, sluggish, weak-muscled elephant that can not even deal effectively with mice.

Chapter 2

Shattering Illusions: A National Security Strategy for 2009-2017

Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.)

Decisions by the last two Democratic and Republican administrations have left the country deeply in debt, depleted our military strength, lowered our national standard of living, and strengthened those around the world whose goals conflict with ours. Much of this can be traced to the initially politically-popular use of military force to attempt to solve problems that are inherently social, economic or political and

therefore do not admit of military solutions. Chief among the examples are Iraq and Afghanistan, where the initial successes against third-rate military opponents have dragged on into separate occupations of a bewildering array of religious, political, and ethnic groups, few of which wish to be dominated by Americans. The solution requires the next administration to explicitly restrict the use of our military forces to those problems that only military forces can solve and that the nation can rally to, and to eschew the use of our forces to serve hubris, propaganda, or dogma.

The advent of nuclear weapons has limited the utility of military force against other major powers: there will be no replays of World War II. For smaller conflicts, history has shown that military occupations of developing countries or alien cultures will be expensive and very unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, the continuing epidemics of crime and political instability in areas where force was initially successful, as in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, show that the West still has no solution to the problem of rebuilding destroyed states.

Recommendations

- The new president needs to formally assess the policy objectives for which military force still has utility in today's world, and propose a program of revamping our force sizes and missions, shaped by the essential requirement to act in concert with America's national ethic and our allies on each of those missions.
- In parallel with this presidential revamping, Congress and the president need to fundamentally change the preparation and presentation of intelligence so that misuse of force based on false pretext becomes far more difficult.
- Congress and the president need to dramatically strengthen regulation of private contractors in the public sector, particularly in the military and intelligence services.

Chapter 3

Leading the Human Dimension Out of a Legacy of Failure

Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)

and Maj. Donald Vandergriff (U.S. Army, ret.)

Institutional failures pervade the current management of military men and women, by far our most important defense resource. The end of the Cold War necessitated fundamental change, yet we remain hobbled by an archaic and dysfunctional personnel system in each of the active military services and their all-important reserves. That archaic system fails to recognize and benefit from the new realities of leading human resources in the 21st century. Without fundamental changes in how we nurture and lead our people, there can be no real military reform.

The military's legacy system is built on flawed constructs: a centralized “beer-can” personnel system, lack of imagination in nurturing leaders, and faulty assumptions about human beings and warfare itself. This concoction is worsened by ingrained behaviors: adversity to risk, preference for the status quo and “group think,” preoccupation with bureaucratic “turf battles,” and valuing contracts above winning wars.

Recommendations

- The fundamental reform requirement is to learn to lead people first and manage things second. Instead, today we administer people as a subset of managing things.
- The primary route to valuing people is to learn to nurture highly innovative, unshakably ethical thinkers. Sadly, in today's armed forces such people, those who lead by virtue of their courage, creativity, boldness, vision, honesty and sometimes irreverence, are known as mavericks. The military services must learn it is admirable to disagree with, change, and improve the institution the individual serves and remains loyal to. Such change-seeking individuals are the ones who best adapt and prevail in humankind's most stressful circumstance: war. They are the war-winning leaders.

Specific recommendations for bringing such people and such values to the fore are articulated in the chapter.

Chapter 4

Maneuver Forces: The Army and Marine Corps after Iraq

Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, ret.)

and Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)

Today's Army and Marine warfighting structures have reached block obsolescence. The strategic conditions that created them no longer exist. The problematic structures are characterized by antiquated, inappropriate World War II-style organizations for combat, inventories of aging and broken equipment thanks to unaffordable and mismanaged modernization programs, heavy operational dependence on large, fixed foreign bases, disjointed unit rotational and readiness policies, and a very troubling exodus of young talent out of the ground combat formations.

Compensating for these deficiencies by binding ground forces more tightly within “networked” systems, such as the Army's misguided Future Combat Systems, does not work and is prohibitively expensive.

Reform lies in changes that promise both huge dollar savings and powerful synergies with proven – not hypothetical – technologies and concepts fielded by the air and naval services. This means a laser-like focus on *people*, *ideas* and *things* in that order.

Recommendations

- Because defined, continuous fronts on the hypothetical World War II model do not exist today and because ubiquitous strike capabilities and proliferating weapons of mass destruction make the concentration of ground forces very dangerous, mobile dispersed warfare is the dominant form of combat we must be prepared to conduct.

- Needed organizational change means new, integrated, more fundamentally “joint” command and control structures for the nation’s ground maneuver forces. This approach expands the nation’s range of strategic options in modern warfare operations against a spectrum of opponents with both conventional and unconventional capabilities.

- Because Marines are now much more likely to conduct Army-like operations far from the sea than they are to re-enact Inchon-style amphibious landings, it is time to harmonize Army and Marine deployments within a predictable joint rotational readiness schedule.

- The authors focus on ways to reorient thinking, organization, and modernization in the ground maneuver force to:
 1. reshape today’s force for new strategic conditions (mobile dispersed warfare);
 2. exploit new technology, new operational concepts, new organizations, and new approaches to readiness, training and leadership; and
 3. extract huge dollar savings through fundamental reorganization and reform.

The authors do not pretend that the changes outlined in the chapter will gain easy acceptance. New strategies, tactics and technologies promising more victories and fewer casualties are typically viewed as threatening by general officers and senior civilians who are comfortable with the status quo.

Chapter 5

A Traveler’s Perspective on Third and Fourth Generation War

William S. Lind

While the United States Marine Corps espouses a doctrine of Third Generation (maneuver) War, it is organized and mentally prepared only for Second Generation (attrition) Warfare. The chapter proposes an alternative structure that reflects Third Generation doctrine.

Recommendations

- Most Marines should again become “trigger pullers.”
- The size of the officer corps above company grades should be drastically reduced.
- A “regimental” system – based on the battalion – would provide mentally and morally cohesive units through unprecedented personnel stability.
- Reserve units should become as capable as active-duty battalions.
- Marines need to convert from line infantry to highly mentally and physically agile, true light (“Jaeger”) infantry.
- Marine aviation should be restructured and re-equipped to reflect the “Jaeger Air” close air support concept with far less costly and inestimably more effective task-designed, single purpose aircraft.

The chapter concludes with a brief look at Fourth Generation War concepts, for which the proposed Marine Corps force structure would also be suitable.

Chapter 6

The Navy

William S. Lind

America’s geography dictates that it must remain a maritime power, but today’s U.S. Navy remains structured to fight the aircraft carrier navy of Imperial Japan. Reform can only proceed from a fundamental understanding that people are most important, ideas come second, and hardware, including ships, is only third.

Recommendations

- The main personnel deficiency of the Navy is an officer corps dominated by technicians. That reinforces the Navy’s Second Generation institutional culture. Reform requires adopting a Third Generation culture and putting the engineers back in the engine room.
- Fourth Generation War demands the Navy shift its focus from Mahanian battles for sea control to controlling coastal and inland waters in places where the state is disintegrating.

- Submarines are today's capital ships, and the U.S. Navy must remain a dominant submarine force while exploring alternative submarine designs.
- Aircraft carriers remain useful "big boxes." However, they should be decoupled from standardized air wings and thought of as general purpose carriers, transporting whatever is useful in a specific crisis or conflict.
- The Navy should acquire an aircraft similar to the Air Force's A-10 so it can begin to effectively support troops on the ground.
- Cruisers, destroyers and frigates are obsolescent as warship types and should be retired; their functions assumed by small carriers or converted merchant ships.
- The Navy should build a new flotilla of small warships suited to green and brown waters and deployable as self-sustaining "packages" in Fourth Generation conflicts. (The Navy's current "Littoral Combat Ship" is an apparently failed attempt at this design.)

Chapter 7

Reversing the Decay of American Air Power

Col. Robert Dilger (U.S. Air Force, ret.) and Pierre M. Sprey

The Air Force's resource allocations and tactical/strategic decisions from the 1930s until today have been dominated by airpower theoretician Giulio Douhet's 1921 assertion that strategic bombardment of an enemy's heartland can win wars independently of ground forces.

The authors' analysis of combat results and spending since 1936 shows the unchanging dominance of that strategic bombardment paradigm has caused the Air Force to:

1. leave close air support capabilities, which have proven far more effective than strategic bombing in determining the outcome of conflicts, essentially unfunded over the last 70 years;
2. habitually underfund effective air-to-air capabilities; and
3. engender serious U.S. military setbacks and unnecessary loss of American lives in each modern conflict America has fought.

The actual combat results of strategic bombardment campaigns in each conflict since 1936 show a consistent pattern of failure to accomplish the assigned military

objectives – and often, no noticeable military results at all. Supporting these bombardment campaigns always entailed very high budget costs, far higher than the costs of close support or air-to-air. There were also consistently high losses of aircrew lives in pursuing strategic bombardment – far higher than the losses in close support or air-to-air. In every theater with sustained air opposition, neither strategic bombardment nor close support proved possible without large forces of air-to-air fighters.

Wherever we mounted significant close support efforts (invariably opposed by bombardment-minded senior Air Force leaders) in mobile battle situations – no matter whether we were retreating or advancing – the military gains proved to be remarkable, out of all proportion to the resources expended.

The implications of the last 70 years of combat results for future Air Force aircraft procurement are not hard to grasp.

Recommendations

- First and foremost, we must abandon a business-as-usual procurement process hopelessly centered on aircraft specifically designed for – or compromised for – strategic bombardment.
- For the first time in U.S. history, we need to provide in peacetime for real, single-purpose close air support forces of substantial size. The only aircraft to succeed in real world close support have been ones that are highly maneuverable at slow speeds and highly resistant to anti-aircraft artillery impacts. High speed jets have consistently failed in close support.
- We must provide adequate air-to-air fighter forces to make close support (and perhaps some small amount of deeper “interdiction” bombing) viable in the face of air-to-air opposition.

To actually implement such forces,

- we must abandon wish-list planning that comes up with outrageously expensive, unimplementable procurement plans.
- Instead, we must fit our aircraft development and procurement plans within fixed, real world budgets – and make sure we develop and buy aircraft so austere designed for single missions (and therefore much more effective than multi-mission “gold-platers”) that we can procure large, adequate forces.
- The authors present a radically new procurement plan, based on new close support, air-to-air, forward air control, and “dirt-strip” airlift aircraft designs of greatly superior effectiveness and vastly lower unit cost. These will make possible buying

over 9,000 new, highly effective airframes over the next 20 years – all *within* current U.S. Air Force budget levels.

Air forces based on these concepts will have unprecedented effectiveness in either conventional or counterinsurgency warfare.

Chapter 8

Air Mobility Alternatives for a New Administration

James P. Stevenson

The Pentagon's current plans for air mobility should not continue; they are not plausible. The United States has the best air mobility capability in the world. Nevertheless, it comes at excessive cost. Even with record-level defense spending, current plans for air mobility are impossible to achieve without huge budget increases – increases which are unnecessary and even counter-productive.

Recommendations

- To reduce the cost of the tanker fleet, the U.S. Air Force should start work on a smaller, cheaper, more tactically effective tanker (KC-Y) as quickly as possible. The Air Force should also stop the currently contemplated buy of large, too expensive KC-X tankers at about 100 aircraft. There exist other innovative ideas to provide more capability at lower cost.
- For strategic air- and sea-lift, the Pentagon should reduce the number of strategic airlifters to approximately 260, which implies retiring C-5As and stopping the buy of C-17s at about 205 aircraft. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) should be increased by at least ten percent. The capacity for fast strategic sealift should be doubled since it dominates the actual fast deployment capabilities of U.S. forces.
- Tactical airlift capability should be about 400 aircraft. The mix of aircraft should include faster retirement of older C-130s, stopping the egregiously high cost C-130J buy at about 100 aircraft, buying more of the smaller, cheaper, more useful-to-the-Army C-27Js, and pursuing a new commercial-derivative airlifter that is more cost-effective than anything in current Air Force plans. The Army's Joint Heavy Lift program should be cancelled.
- For Special Operations air capabilities, the CV-22 should be stopped immediately, replacing it with one or more new, cost-effective helicopters. New variants of the C-130Js and C-27J should replace MC-130s and AC-130s. A new irregular warfare wing of small, manned aircraft should be started instead of less effective unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The chapter advocates a strategic focus on aerial refueling and special operations air warfare, with less emphasis on strategic and tactical airlift. In all cases, innovative solutions that run counter to conventional wisdom allow us to lower costs without loss of overall capability.

Chapter 9

The Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve Bruce I. Gudmundsson

The chapter lays out the broad outlines of a new approach to the recruitment, organization, and training of reserve forces. Essentially, it would mean a reserve component much more closely tied in outlook and mission to the citizenry it defends.

Recommendations

- A somewhat smaller National Guard should focus on homeland security missions.
- Most units of the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve should be organized as “lifecycle units,” organizations in which members remain together for the entire course of their initial terms of service. As such, these units should receive much more training than they currently receive.
- Training schedules and benefits packages should be custom tailored to the civilian occupations of their individual members. For example, units composed of college students – of which there would be many based on the recreated incentives packages – will have longer periods of initial training as well two-month periods of training each summer. Similarly, units composed of people with seasonal occupations would train in their “off-season.”

Chapter 10

Long in Coming, the Acquisition Train Wreck is Here

Thomas Christie

After more than four decades of supposedly well-structured defense planning and programming, as well numerous studies aimed at reforming its multi-billion dollar acquisition system, the Pentagon’s decision process governing our defense establishment is clearly broken. We need far-reaching, even radical, remedial initiatives. The evidence supporting the need for drastic action abounds.

Despite the largest defense budgets in real terms in more than 60 years, we have a smaller military force structure than at any time during that period, one that is equipped to a great extent with worn-out, aging equipment.

Granted, the employment of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed to the wear and tear on our combat and support equipment, particularly for our

ground forces. The bill for repairing and replacing that equipment (reported to be in the hundreds of billions) is mostly yet to be faced. And, more to the point, this only exacerbates the already severe modernization problems faced by all three services. Those problems have been on the horizon for decades and would have plagued our forces even if the war on terror had not evolved as ruinously as it has since 2001.

A fundamental source of DOD's problems is the historically long pattern of unrealistically high defense budget projections combined with equally unrealistic low estimates of the costs of new programs. The net effect is for DOD's leaders to claim that they can afford the weapons they want to buy. Thus, there is no urgency to face up to the needed hard choices on new weapon systems. In addition, there are other looming demands on the budget, such as health care for both active and retired personnel and planned increases in ground forces manpower. Any confidence that DOD's in-house goals can be achieved in the future (even with increased spending) is sorely mistaken.

Recommendations

See below for Chapter 11.

Chapter 11

Understand, Then Contain America's Out-of-Control Defense Budget

Winslow T. Wheeler

As Thomas Christie and Franklin C. "Chuck" Spinney have argued, major U.S. defense components are now smaller, older, and less operationally ready than at any time in recent history. This collapse has occurred in the face of the highest levels of defense spending since the end of World War II. This is not compensated by the (false) illusion that our smaller military forces are more effective due to their "high tech," sophisticated nature. In fact, what many proclaim to be "high tech" is merely high complexity – at extraordinarily high budgetary and operational cost. The armed forces, Congress, and many others seek to solve the problems with still more money, which will only accelerate the shrinking, the aging, and the diminishing of combat effectiveness. In fact, if existing ways of thinking and current processes are employed, more money will guarantee failure. Decades of data make this counterintuitive conclusion unavoidable.

Recommendations

- There can be no recovery without being able to track how DOD spends its money, which is not now done. The first order of priority is to force DOD to comply with federal laws and regulations that require financial accountability – without permitting the exercise of the many loopholes Congress and DOD managers have created and exploited.

- Analytical integrity based on real world combat history must be applied to the rigorous evaluation of DOD programs and policies, now riddled with bias and advocacy. In the absence of objective, independent assessment of weapons program cost, performance, and schedule (especially at the beginning of any program), DOD decision-makers have no ability to manage programs with any competence whatsoever.
- A new panel of independent, objective professionals (with no contemporaneous or future ties whatsoever with industry or other sources of bias and self-interest) should be convened by the president to assess
 1. the extent to which DOD programs and policies do or do not fit with current world conditions,
 2. the president's national security strategy, and – very importantly –
 3. a realistic assessment of the reduced budget that will be available for the Department of Defense.
- This panel should provide the secretary of defense his primary advice on how to proceed with DOD program acquisition and management until such time as the military services and the regular civilian bureaucracy have demonstrated sufficient competence and objectivity to re-assert primary control.
- The president should expect strong protest from the advocates of business-as-usual in the military services, the civilian Pentagon bureaucracy, Congress, industry, and “think tanks.” Many such individuals cannot now conceive of a U.S. national security apparatus run outside the boundaries of what they have grown accustomed to and what they have advocated. Most will refuse to adapt. Those who can adapt, especially in the military services, should be brought back into the decision-making structure. Those who cannot should anticipate a career outside the Department of Defense.